Saint Louis University Law Journal
Volume 46
Number 1 (Winter 2002)

Article 12

2-12-2002

The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 and the Missed Opportunity
to Apply the Act in Guardianships
Richard B. Maltby

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard B. Maltby, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 and the Missed Opportunity to Apply the Act in
Guardianships, 46 St. Louis U. L.J. (2002).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol46/iss1/12

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more information,
please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978 AND THE MISSED
OPPORTUNITY TO APPLY THE ACT IN GUARDIANSHIPS

I. INTRODUCTION
State courts have had over two decades to mold the Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978 (“ICWA” or “the Act”)1 into a mechanism for protecting Indian
heritage while simultaneously providing the ideal nurturing conditions for
Indian children who are the subjects of custodial proceedings involving a nonparent.2 Although there are no typical ICWA cases, each case poses common
procedural requirements, and the Act, like any other federal statute, is best
served by uniform compliance.3 Even so, judges, attorneys and caseworkers
are unfamiliar with or resistant to ICWA, therefore necessitating critical
consideration of the purpose of the Act.4 This is especially true because of the
greater frequency of ICWA cases in recent years.5 Since the statute was
enacted, well over 250 court decisions have shaped the area of Indian child
law.6 Thus, very clearly, a need exists for a better understanding of ICWA and
the intricacies involved in its function.
Too often, courts struggle with the Act’s application because it is not clear
as to the circumstances that require its use.7 One situation that has yet to be
addressed in any major court decision and which poses potentially damaging
1. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63 (1994).
2. See generally Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989); see also
In re Shawboose, 438 N.W.2d 272 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); In re Adoption of S.S., 622 N.E.2d
832 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
3. Helen Ann Yunis & Katherine Scotta, The Indian Child Welfare Act: A Case Study, 2
MICH. CHILD WELFARE J. 14, 14 (1998).
4. Id.
5. B.J. Jones, The Indian Child Welfare Act – The need for a separate law, American Bar
Association (Aug. 29, 2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/genpractice/compleat/
f95child.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2000)
6. Id.
7. Peter K. Wahl, Little Power to Help Brenda? A Defense of the Indian Child Welfare Act
and Its Continued Implementation in Minnesota, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 811, 836 (2000).
Wahl suggests that “officials do not follow ICWA as strictly as they should,” “continued disdain
for protecting Indian culture appears prevalent among those expected to be most instrumental in
preservation” and “there is a lack of knowledge regarding ICWA and the need for cultural
preservation.” Wahl also refers to a January 1992 study in Hennepin County, Minnesota, which
makes clear, he contends, that “greater attention to ICWA is necessary in many areas in order to
comply with federal law.” Id.
213
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effects on Indian tribes, Indian children and Indian culture as such is the
creation and termination of guardianships. Although many state statutes
require the presiding judge to routinely inquire as to whether a child in a
custody proceeding is an Indian,8 they do not indicate that guardianships are
considered child custody proceedings that require the same inquiry into Indian
tribe membership.9 As a result, a situation is created where a major mistake
can be made in overlooking ICWA’s applicability.
The Act clearly applies to guardianship proceedings where the parent or
Indian custodian cannot have the child returned upon demand, even if parental
rights have not been terminated.10 Reasons for this oversight involve a
combination of ignorance and disdain for federal law.11 Because state
statutory schemes, court rules and case law normally do not include a
guardianship proceeding as a child custody proceeding,12 it becomes easy for a
state judge to simply conclude that ICWA does not apply to Indian children in
guardianships. Furthermore, many litigators and judges assume ICWA only
applies when the state, and not a private party, is seeking an out-of-home
placement. Moreover, the Act was intended to govern not only state and
county social services programs, but judicial practices as well; state regulations
are not directed at courts, thus leaving it to judges or the parties to invoke
ICWA themselves.
The purpose of this legislative Note is to recognize the tendency of courts
to make this mistake and to encourage the correction of the oversight in order
to remain consistent with the congressional intent of preserving Indian heritage
in determining the living arrangements that would be in the best interests of the
Indian child. Part II is an examination of the policies that drove Congress to
enact ICWA. Critical attention is given to the special standard adopted for
considering the best interests of the Indian child, the constitutionality of the
legislation and the Act’s success in achieving Congress’s purpose. Part II also
provides the backdrop for explaining the Act’s justification and application to
child custody proceedings.
Part III is a discussion of the proceedings which are covered and which are
not covered by the Act and the importance of involving tribal courts when
possible. This necessitates mentioning three critical aspects of the Act:
jurisdictional requirements, the tribal notice requirement and placement
8. Interview with Hon. Michael Anderegg, Michigan Tribal Court (Oct. 20, 2000).
9. 25 U.S.C. § 1903.
10. Id. Conversely, the implication is that if a guardianship exists where the parent or Indian
custodian has relinquished the child but can have her returned upon request, then ICWA is
inapplicable.
11. See Yunis & Scotta, supra note 3, at 14.
12. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (7th ed. 1999) (defining a “custody hearing” as “[a]
judicial examination of the facts relating to parental custody in a divorce or separation
proceeding”).
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preferences of Indian children. Part IV discusses the special situation of
ICWA guardianships, explains the potential for misconstruing this aspect of
the federal legislation and provides illustrations of the rare cases where courts
properly identified ICWA guardianships.
Part V is an analysis of whether courts are correctly identifying ICWA
guardianships and a study of state statutes and court rules which aid in ICWA
litigation. It also includes an analysis of other aspects of ICWA guardianships,
including the balance of rights between the guardian and non-custodial
parent(s), applying ICWA when a guardianship is ambiguously defined by
state law and the effects of failing to apply ICWA to guardianships. Finally, in
Part VI, a conclusion is drawn that courts and legislatures must become more
assertive in developing explicit laws pertaining to ICWA guardianships to
avoid frustrating the principles that drove Congress to pass the legislation.
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ICWA
A.

The Policies Framed in ICWA

It is essential to understand the motivation behind ICWA to become
familiar with the provisions of the Act, especially those that appear to be
unclear. ICWA was enacted in 1978 to “protect the best interests of the Indian
children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and
families . . . .”13 It was a part of a congressional “restitution policy”14
instituted in the 1970s in response to Western civilization’s undermining of
Native American political, economic and cultural practices over the previous
hundred years.15 Indian law scholars explain that
[f]ederal Indian policy has always dealt, at its nub, with the question of
whether and to what extent the United States should permit, encourage, or
force the assimilation of American Indians into the majority society . . . . [A]
prominent force behind assimilationist policy has been the desire for Indian
land and resources. But it is not that simple. Many non-Indians, especially
those unfamiliar with Indian people and Indian reservations, see life on the
reservations as undesirable, as a blot on our national character. To them,
Indians themselves would benefit by leaving tribal life behind and sharing in
the benefits offered by the majority society.16

13. 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
14. Alissa M. Wilson, The Best Interests of Children in the Cultural Context of the Indian
Child Welfare Act in In Re S.S. and R.S., 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 839, 845 (1997).
15. Id. at 844-45.
16. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS 26 (3d ed.
1998).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

216

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46:213

Ultimately, Congress determined that Native American traditions, values and
customs were more important to preserve than was the assimilation of Native
Americans into the dominant17 Anglo-Saxon lifestyle.18
More specifically, this legislation was a response to the high rate of
removal of Indian children from Indian homes and placement into non-Indian
foster and adoptive homes and institutions.19 Because of cultural differences
and biases and the dominating authority of state courts, Indian children were
too easily removed from their Indian families and tribes altogether. A survey
of large Indian populations, conducted by the Association of American Indian
Affairs, revealed that twenty-five to thirty-five percent of all Indian children
were removed from their homes and placed into foster homes, adoptive homes
or institutions.20 Eighty-five percent of those children placed in foster care
were placed in non-Indian homes.21 In response to these concerns, Congress,
through ICWA, established “minimum Federal standards for the removal of
Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in foster
or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian
culture . . . .”22

17. Three decades after the introduction of restitution policy, one could quite easily argue
that America is a much more diverse country nowadays and is much more accommodating to all
cultures within its borders. Thus, the use of the word “dominant” has lost a bit of its stinging
resonance in this context.
18. B.J. JONES, THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT HANDBOOK—A LEGAL GUIDE TO
CUSTODY AND ADOPTION OF NATIVE AMERICAN CHILDREN 4 (1995) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
19. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4). See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq.
(1978).
20. David Woodward, The Rights of Reservation Parents and Children: Cultural Survival or
the Final Termination?, in NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS 101-02
(John R. Wunder ed., 1999) (citing 1 ASSOCIATION ON AMERICA INDIAN AFFAIRS, INC., INDIAN
FAMILY DEFENSE 1 (1974)).
21. Woodward, supra note 20, at 102 (citing 1 ASSOCIATION ON AMERICA INDIAN AFFAIRS,
INC., INDIAN FAMILY DEFENSE 2 (1974)). Woodward provides a vivid example of the unethical,
yet typical, pre-ICWA practices:
On January 9, 1973, Delphine Foote, a 24-year-old mother from the Standing Rock Sioux
Reservation, left her infant son, Christopher, with the South Dakota Welfare Department
and her signature on a form which stated explicitly that relinquishment of custody was
strictly temporary. That statement was reinforced by the oral understanding between Ms.
Foote and her assigned social worker that Christopher would be immediately returned
upon demand. The mother subsequently made that demand only to have the Department
institute a neglect and dependency proceeding against her in an attempt to terminate her
parental rights to Christopher and thereby facilitate his adoption by the non-Indian foster
parents with whom he had been placed.
Id. at 102 (citing Habeas Corpus Hearing, Mobridge, S.D. (Cir. Ct. 6th Jud. Dist., Apr. 1974)).
22. 25 U.S.C. § 1902. “Congress has always felt a traditional interest in Indian affairs
deriving from the authority given it in the Constitution ‘to regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.’” WILCOMB E. WASHBURN,
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One issue that arises is whether the best interests of the child is subservient
to the best interest of the tribe. Congress has identified both as vital,23 but
problems arise when these two interests conflict. The question, then, is
whether one concern supercedes the other. The text of the Act gives no
guidance. In these situations, it is probably most logical to apply a balancing
test. For instance, consider a situation where a non-Indian guardian has cared
for an Indian child for an extended period of time. Both of the biological
parents have been nonexistent in the child’s life for years. But one parent who
is an alcoholic and has a history of child abuse and neglect initiates an action to
regain possession of the child. The court must balance the two purposes of the
Act: is it more important to allow the child to develop within the Indian
community despite the risk posed by the abusive parent, or should the child’s
Indian heritage be ignored in order to ensure nurturing within a caring home?
These decisions can go either way depending on the factual context of the case.
B.

The Best Interests of the Indian Child

The traditional theory of the best interests of the child emphasizes that the
psychological bonding between the child and adult is a very important
consideration in determining a child’s best interest.24 This notion of the best
interests of the child is threaded into practically all child custody statutes.25
However, the concept of best interests in ICWA requires looking not only at
the child’s psychological bond with a parent, custodian or guardian, but also
considering “the rights of the Indian child as an Indian and the rights of the
Indian community and tribe in retaining [its] children in its society.”26 ICWA
expresses Congress’s belief that Native Americans have such unique child-

RED MAN’S LAND/WHITE MAN’S LAW: THE PAST AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE AMERICAN
INDIAN 214 (2d ed. 1995) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
23. 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
24. See, e.g., In re Kassandra H. v. Patricia F., 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
25. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1994) (“‘The best interests of the child’ means all
relevant factors to be considered and evaluated by the court including . . . the intimacy of the
relationship between each parent and the child . . .” and “the interaction and interrelationship of
the child with a parent or parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the
child’s best interest . . . .”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-102 (2000) (“‘Best interests of the child’
means the physical, mental, psychological conditions and needs of the child and any other factor
considered by the court to be relevant to the child.”); W. V. CODE § 48-11-102 (2000) (“The
primary objective of this article is to serve the child’s best interest, by facilitating [inter alia]
[c]ontinuity of existing parent-child attachments . . . .”); and MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.23 (2000)
(“‘[B]est interests of the child’ means . . . [inter alia] [t]he love, affection, and other emotional
ties existing between the parties involved and the child . . .” and “[t]he capacity and disposition of
the parties involved to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education
and raising of the child in his or her religion or creed, if any.”).
26. Hon. Maurice Portley, The Indian Child Welfare Act: A Primer, 36 ARIZ. ATT’Y 24, 25
(2000) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1386 (1978)).
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raising practices that state statutes are inadequate instruments for determining
the best interests of an Indian child.27 The widespread removal of Native
American children from their families had detrimental effects on Native
American tribes, which depended upon the unity of their communities and
traditions for their survival.28 Much weight must be given to the value of
allowing the child to develop within the Indian community. Congress’s theory
is that the modified best interest standard can be utilized to arrive at desirable
outcomes.29
Native Americans rely heavily on survival of the “whole” to which they
belong, which includes not only their immediate families, but also the
communal tribe, the land on which they live and the wildlife that surrounds
them.30 This style of living is impressed upon Indian children from birth
through child-rearing traditions such as oral storytelling,31 which is a means of
teaching rules on living and how to treat other people and animals.32
Additionally, Indian children often have responsibilities that extend beyond

27. HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 5.
28. Id.
29. These outcomes include a reduction in the rate of Indian children placed outside the
tribal home and an increase in tribal participation in the judicial process. The Supreme Court
decision in Palmore v. Sidoti also brings about important considerations with regard to Indian
children’s best interests. 466 U.S. 429 (1984). There, the Court ruled that courts may not
consider race as the sole factor in determining the best interests. Id. at 434. The scope of this
landmark decision is unclear. Perhaps the decision extends to ethnicity. Further, perhaps race or
ethnicity may be considered as one factor among many. Two points should be noted: First, the
party asserting that race should be considered in Palmore may have been concerned that suffering
would be sure to come in the future. That is, because the child was not part of a racially aligned
family, that child might experience emotional and psychological problems in the future. With its
decision, the Court did not accept this line of reasoning, which seems to contravene the special
standard for determining an Indian child’s best interest. But see text accompanying notes 35-39.
Second, the Palmore decision suggests that child custody considerations should be hierarchically
arranged—that is, maybe the Palmore Court sacrificed the child’s best interest because
preventing racial discrimination was a higher constitutional priority for the Court. If this is the
case, maybe ICWA should be construed as a hierarchical arrangement between the Indian child’s
interest and the preservation of Indian heritage—the Court has always given special protection to
the Indian tribe, so it may be more of a priority than the Indian child’s best interests. See text
accompanying notes 35-39.
30. HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 5 (citing JOHN F. BRYDE, MODERN INDIAN PSYCHOLOGY
(1971)).
31. Id. (citing MICHAEL J. CADUTO & JOSEPH BRUCHAC, KEEPERS OF THE ANIMALS:
NATIVE AMERICAN STORIES AND WILDLIFE ACTIVITIES FOR CHILDREN (1991)).
32. Id. (citing THOMAS MAILS, FOOLS CROW: WISDOM AND POWER (1991)). Oral
storytelling is also a tradition in many other cultures. However, when comparing Native
American oral storytelling traditions to that of the Anglo-Saxon society, it is apparent that
storytelling is a much more prevalent and deliberate tool for child rearing in the Native American
culture.
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their nuclear family.33 This is considerably different from the formal education
process and practices of the typical immediate family in the Anglo-Saxon
culture. These fundamental differences in values and methods of child-rearing
provided Congress with the justification to develop a different standard for
determining the placement of Indian children within or outside the Indian
home.34
C. Challenges to the Constitutionality of ICWA
The different best interests standard, as well as other provisions of ICWA,
has repeatedly withstood constitutional challenges.35 The United States
Supreme Court has recognized that there is a special relationship between the
federal government and Indian tribes. The government’s responsibilities have
been characterized as being similar to a guardian in a trust relationship.36
Congress has an enumerated power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes.37
Courts recognized even before the enactment of ICWA that tribal courts had
jurisdiction in domestic relations problems, including marriages, adoptions,
divorces, property distributions and determination of children’s rights, so long
as the parties resided on the reservation.38 In the past, however, state law
usually applied to Indians in these same cases if they ventured off the
reservation; they were no longer under the jurisdiction of the reservation tribal
courts.39 Today, this is not the case as Congress has dictated a broader scope
for tribal court jurisdiction.

33. Id. (citing ELLA CARA DELORIA, WATERLILY (1988) (detailing a Dakota woman’s life
from birth to old age)).
34. See HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 6. But see David Null, In re Junious M.: The
California Application of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 8 J. JUV. L. 74, 86 (1984) (“The . . . Act
was promulgated for all the right reasons. The Act is flawed, however, because it failed to
consider that many children are, in fact, of multiracial backgrounds with little identity or heritage
as Indians to protect.”).
35. See, e.g., In re Appeal of Pima County Juvenile Action S-903, 635 P.2d 187 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982). Also note that the Palmore Court did not
address ICWA, so even after 1984, ICWA has remained intact. See supra note 29.
36. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); United States v. Mitchell, 463
U.S. 206 (1980).
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
38. HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 7 (citing Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976)
(discussing exclusive authority to grant on-reservation adoption)); NoFire v. United States, 164
U.S. 657 (1897) (discussing authority to grant marriage license); Conroy v. Conroy, 575 F.2d 175
(8th Cir. 1978) (discussing authority to divide marital property); Carney v. Chapman, 247 U.S.
102 (1918); Heart v. Ellenbecker, 689 F. Supp. 989 (D.S.D. 1988).
39. Id. (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973)).
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D. Achieving Its Purpose
ICWA has alleviated some of the problems Congress intended to address
with its enactment. Its mere existence naturally forces judicial recognition of
Native American concerns. The rapidly increasing number of ICWA cases is
evidence that courts have involved tribes, tribal courts and other Indian parties
more frequently than before enactment. Consequently, the rate of removal
from Indian homes has been reduced over the last two decades.40 However,
removal of Indian children from their Indian homes seems to be
disproportionately high compared with removal of non-Indian children from
their ethnic or racial homes.41 Nevertheless, ICWA appears to be legislation
that has the ultimate capability of ensuring the survival of Indian tribes, while
providing a proper environment for the nurturing of Indian children, at least in
most cases. The key to achieving this end is providing courts with awareness
of the broad scope of the Act’s application. As with any statute, there exists a
problem interpreting Congress’s intent. Hence, educating courts on situations
that require the applicability of ICWA becomes imperative to promote
uniformity.
The two-fold purpose of the Act is “to protect the best interests of Indian
children and promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and
families . . . .”42 These motivations for the legislation were based on
congressional findings and must be considered while interpreting every
provision in the Act to determine how courts should apply it.43
III. APPLICATION OF ICWA: HOW DOES IT WORK?
An analysis of any aspect of ICWA requires an understanding of how the
Act operates to achieve its stated objectives. Before delving into the
guardianship issues, it is essential to discuss the scope and jurisdictional
underpinnings of the Act. Generally, these underpinnings are geared toward
promoting active Indian party and tribal court participation. Nevertheless,
these legitimate means of carrying out the objectives of Congress do not
entirely eliminate the tendency of overwhelming placement of Indian children
in non-Indian homes by state courts.

40. See Wahl, supra note 7, at 836.
41. See id. at 836 n.151. Wahl points out, for example, that “Indian children in Minnesota
continue to be removed from their homes ten times more frequently than Caucasian children.” Id.
at 836. Similarly, “Indian children represent less than one percent of the children in Minnesota,
but comprise nearly twelve percent of the state’s out-of-home placements.” Id.
42. 25 U.S.C. § 1902; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
43. Wilson, supra note 14, at 847-48 n.69.
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Distinguishing Proceedings Covered and Not Covered by ICWA

The Act only applies to “child custody proceedings.” It defines four types:
(1) “foster care placement” which means “any action removing an Indian child
from its parent or Indian custodian for temporary placement in a foster home or
institution or the home of a guardian or conservator where the parent or Indian
custodian cannot have the child returned upon demand, but where parental
rights have not been terminated”; (2) “termination of parental rights” which
means “any action resulting in the termination of the parent-child
relationship”; (3) “pre-adoptive placement” which means “the temporary
placement of an Indian child in a foster home or institution after the
termination of parental rights, but prior to or in lieu of adoptive placement”;
and (4) “adoptive placement” which means the permanent placement of an
Indian child for adoption, including any action resulting in a final decree of
adoption.”44
Once the court determines whether the proceeding is a child custody
proceeding, the next question to answer is whether the child is an Indian.45 As
defined by the Act, an “Indian child” is “any unmarried person who is either a
member of an Indian tribe or is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and
is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.”46 The tribe must be
federally recognized for a child to be eligible.47 Typically, courts leave it to
the relevant tribe to declare that the child is either a member or eligible for
membership in the tribe.48 Any decision made by the tribe pertaining to
membership or eligibility is given full faith and credit.49 Once the child is
deemed an Indian and the proceeding falls within ICWA, the court must
conclude that ICWA applies.
The latitude given tribes to make membership and eligibility decisions is
clearly a deliberate attempt by Congress to increase tribal participation, and
undoubtedly an intention to decrease the removal of children from Native
American tribes.50 It is not an objective practice by any means. These
decisions are usually based on the composition of Indian blood in the
individual, and the blood requirements can vary greatly from tribe to tribe.51 If
a proceeding reaches this stage, where the tribe must determine membership or
44. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1).
45. Portley, supra note 26, at 25. See also generally, HANDBOOK, supra note 18.
46. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
47. The Secretary of Interior publishes annually a list of Indian tribes eligible for federal
services and programs. It is rare to be deemed an eligible Indian tribe, but not be recognized on
the list. See, e.g., Interest of C.H., 510 N.W.2d 119 (S.D. 1993).
48. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). This means a state court is preempted from determining membership.
49. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d).
50. Wahl, supra note 7, at 811-32.
51. Id. at 831-32.
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eligibility, in theory, state courts have no discretion as to whether the Act
applies; the decision is left to the tribe and hinges on whether the tribe finds
that the child is an Indian.52
However, even when a child is deemed an Indian, there are instances
where the proceeding is not covered by ICWA. The Act does not apply to
custody disputes between the two natural parents.53 Another important type of
proceeding not covered under ICWA is delinquency placements. These are
placement proceedings involving “act[s] which, if committed by an adult
would be deemed a crime . . . .”54
A third exception to ICWA application is a judicially created minority
position that is inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court holding in
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, the most famous ICWA
case since the Act’s inception.55 In Holyfield, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that the state court did not have jurisdiction over a child custody
proceeding involving a reservation-domiciled Native American couple who
placed their twins with a non-Native American family residing off the
reservation for adoption.56 This reversed the Mississippi Supreme Court’s
holding that ICWA did not apply in the adoption case because the Indian
children had never resided with a Native American family and were not
domiciled on the reservation. The United States Supreme Court sent a strong
message to state courts that, even where parents voluntarily give up their
children, ICWA can still apply. Thus, in Holyfield, the Choctaw Tribe had the
right to be put on notice of the action.57 Furthermore, the tribal court had the
right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction.58 The Court reasoned that it was not a
question of outcome, but rather a question of who should decide the outcome.59
This rationale suggests that tribal court involvement is of utmost importance.
In spite of the Supreme Court’s ruling, state court decisions in Washington,60

52. Portley, supra note 26, at 25.
53. In re Sengstock, 477 N.W.2d 717 (S.D. 1989); Malatarre v. Malatarre, 293 N.W.2d 139
(N.D. 1980); In re Baisley, 749 P.2d 446 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
54. 25 U.S.C. 1903(1). See, e.g., T.D.C, 748 P.2d 201, 203 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting
application of ICWA to placement of an Indian child for the commission of criminal conduct
even though conduct was not serious under 42 U.S.C. § 5603(14) (1994)). However, note that
“[t]here are several exceptions to this general rule, many of which are discussed in the guidelines
enacted by the Department of Interior to guide state courts in the implementation of ICWA.”
HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 14. See Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs
Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584 (Nov. 26,
1979).
55. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
56. Id. at 40-41.
57. Id. at 53-54.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 53.
60. In re Crews, 825 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992).
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Oklahoma,61 Alabama62 and Louisiana63 have held that this exception still
exists. While some of these courts made attempts at distinguishing Holyfield,
these decisions reflect ignorance of or, perhaps more accurately, disdain for
federal law.64
Finally, most importantly as it relates to guardianships, a fourth proceeding
not covered by ICWA is placement of a child where the parent can regain
custody of the child upon demand.65 The definition of “foster care placement”
is limited. The only kind of guardianship covered by the Act is one where the
child cannot be returned upon demand; it is a subset of foster care
placements.66 If the parent can regain possession of the child upon demand,
then ICWA is inapplicable.67 Situations where the parent can demand the child
be returned are often voluntary. This voluntary parental right can be revoked
rather easily. This voluntary placement occurs frequently due to the
educational and religious needs of the child.68 It should not be confused with
the voluntary placement for purposes of an adoption, which ICWA clearly
governs.69

61. In re S.C., 833 P.2d 1249 (Okla. 1992).
62. S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990).
63. Barbry v. Dauzat, 576 So. 2d 1013 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
64. See C.E.H. v. L.M.W., 837 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). Jones points out that the
appeals court “also suggested in rather strong dicta that the existing family exception is
doctrinally correct, although the court there went on to apply the act.” HANDBOOK, supra note
18, at 25 n.26. See supra text accompanying notes 4, 11.
65. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i).
66. Id.
67. Id. This is implied from the text of the Act: foster care placement means “any action
removing an Indian child from its parent or Indian custodian for temporary placement in a foster
home or institution or the home of a guardian or conservator where the parent or Indian
custodian cannot have the child returned upon demand, but where parental rights have not been
terminated.” Id. (emphasis added).
68. Jones notes:
One reason there has been a high incidence of “voluntary” placements of Indian children
for education purposes has been the failure of the Bureau of Indian Affairs to construct
schools that are in close proximity to many Indian population bases. In the 1984
Oversight Hearings on the Indian Child Welfare Act, the Association on American Indian
Affairs cited BIA statistics showing that almost one out of every two Indian students in
the BIA education system had to be placed at a boarding school because of the absence of
local day schools. This, as Congress noted at Title IV of ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1961(a),
contributed to the displacement problems that ICWA was enacted to address. This
problem has been somewhat alleviated by new standards for BIA schools. See 25 U.S.C.
§ 2001e, which stresses the need for local day schools.
HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 24 n.13.
69. See 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a). See also HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 24 n.14:
The Department of Interior has promulgated recent amendments to 25 C.F.R. § 23.1 et
seq., in which the department defines “child custody proceeding” to also include “other
tribal placements made in accordance with the placement preferences of the Act,
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Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction is at the very heart of ICWA.70 Congress intended to give
tribal courts jurisdiction whenever possible because of their superior
knowledge of Indian child-rearing practices, traditions and customs.71 It falls
squarely in line with the purposes of the Act: to preserve Indian heritage and to
determine the child’s best interests using the unique standard.72 Tribal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over “any custody proceeding involving an Indian
child who resides or is domiciled73 within the reservation of such tribe, except
where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal
law.”74 They also have exclusive jurisdiction “[w]here an Indian child is a
ward of a tribal court . . . notwithstanding the residence or domicile of the
child.”75 When the tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction, the state court is
entirely removed from the case and cannot exercise any decision-making
authority.
If the Indian child is not domiciled within an Indian reservation or is not a
ward of the tribal court, there is still a presumption of tribal jurisdiction.76 A
case should be transferred to the tribal court unless there has been an express
rejection of jurisdiction by the tribal court, an objection by either parent to the
transfer or good cause is shown not to make the transfer.77 Furthermore, the
tribe can intervene at any time in the proceeding to protect its interests.78

including the temporary or permanent placement of an Indian child in accordance with
tribal children’s codes and local tribal customs or traditions.” 59 Fed. Reg. 2,257
(January 13, 1994). The import of this amendment is unclear.
Id.
70. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989).
71. HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 29.
72. See supra notes 13, 42 and accompanying text.
73. The Holyfield Court established that a child’s domicile is the same as his or her parents’
and an illegitimate child’s domicile is the same as his or her mother’s. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 48.
74. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a).
75. Id.
76. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 36 (interpreting 25 U.S.C. § 1911).
77. In re A.P., 961 P.2d 706, 712 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998).
ICWA does not define “good cause.” Courts have followed the criteria adopted by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs. Good cause exists (1) if the Indian child’s tribe does not have a
tribal court as defined by the act; (2) if the proceeding was at an advanced stage when the
petition to transfer was filed and the petitioner did not file promptly after receiving notice
of the hearing; (3) if the Indian child is older than 12 years of age and objects to the
transfer; (4) if the tribal court would be an inconvenient forum to the parties or the
witnesses; and (5) if the parents of a child older than five years of age are not available
and the child has had little or no contact with the child’s tribe or its members.
Id.; see 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b); 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584 (Nov. 26, 1979).
78. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c).
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C. The Notice Requirement
There are a number of procedural mandates to follow once it is determined
that ICWA governs. Depending on whether the proceeding is voluntary or
involuntary, certain provisions require different procedures. All requirements
are intended to establish a high level of protection for parents and tribes from
states’ abilities to remove a child from the home and from the Indian tribe.
One such mandate is the notice requirement for involuntary proceedings.
Congress’s notion was that “a child’s Indian tribe has a discrete interest,
separate from a parent’s or Indian custodian’s, in any proceeding involving the
child that must be protected throughout.”79 Notice must be given to parents, or
the Secretary of the Interior if the parents’ location is unknown, and to the
relevant tribe(s).80 This requirement is extremely important. Without proper
notice the underlying principles of the Act are frustrated because none of the
Indian parties enter the action to protect the tribal interests and the child’s
interests as it relates to his or her Indian heritage.
D. Placement of Indian Children in Foster Care and Through Adoption
The goal of Congress was to place Indian children “in foster or adoptive
homes which would reflect the unique values of Indian culture . . . .”81 The
Supreme Court stated in Holyfield that the placement preferences expressed in
§ 1915(a) of the Act are “[t]he most important substantive requirements
imposed on state courts . . . .”82 Absent good cause,83 when placing a child in a
foster home, the child must be placed with
(i) a member of the Indian child’s extended family; (ii) a foster home licensed,
approved or specified by the Indian child’s tribe; (iii) an Indian foster home
licensed or approved by an authorized non-Indian licensing authority; or (iv)
an institution for children approved by the Indian tribe or operated by an
Indian organization which has a program suitable to meet the Indian child’s
needs.84

ICWA also requires that, absent good cause, Indian children placed for
adoption must be placed with “(1) a member of the child’s extended family; (2)

79. HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 51 (citing Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 49).
80. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).
81. Id. § 1902.
82. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 31.
83. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. The significance of giving a child discretion
to determine jurisdiction on the condition that she reaches a certain age (the age of 12 if referring
to the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ good cause definition) is important. It diminishes the chances of
finding tribal court jurisdiction. It allows room for a “mature” Indian child to make a decision
which Congress implicitly expresses would be in the best interests of the child. This is a very
rare instance where an Indian party may side with the non-Indian party.
84. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

226

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46:213

other members of the Indian child’s tribe; or (3) other Indian families.”85
Clearly, these preferences show that Congress intended to allow all reasonable
alternatives to keep the Indian child within the tribe whenever it was
impossible to maintain the child’s ties with his or her parents.86
IV. THE CASE OF GUARDIANSHIPS
A.

Identifying the ICWA Guardianship

Section 1911 of the Act establishes exclusive jurisdiction for “[a]n Indian
tribe . . . over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who
resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe . . . .”87
Furthermore, “[w]here an Indian child is a ward of a tribal court, the Indian
tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence or
domicile of the child.”88 A careful examination of the definitions provides
insight as to when these provisions necessitate application of the Act. A child
custody proceeding includes foster care placement. Foster care placement
includes an action “removing an Indian child from its parent or Indian
custodian for temporary placement in a foster home or institution or the home
of a guardian or conservator where the parent or Indian custodian cannot
have the child returned upon demand, but where parental rights have not been
terminated.”89 In other words, state courts must be aware that ICWA applies to
a substantial amount of guardianships, and guardianships, ultimately, are a
subset of foster care placements.
B.

Misconstruing ICWA as It Applies to Foster Care Placements

Even if a court recognizes that some, but not all, guardianships are covered
by ICWA, thereby successfully avoiding a missed opportunity to apply the
Act, potential for misconstruing the Act as it pertains to foster care placements,
specifically guardianships, remains a concern. The language of § 1913(b) of
the Act, which states, “[a]ny parent or Indian custodian may withdraw consent
to a foster care placement under State law at any time and, upon such
withdrawal, the child shall be returned to the parent or Indian custodian,”90
85. Id. § 1915(a).
86. HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 84. While these are legitimate means of carrying out the
objectives of Congress, many states continue to overwhelmingly place Indian children in nonIndian homes, a problem the construction of the scope and jurisdictional requirements were
intended to eliminate. Id. Jones points out that this does not necessarily reflect ignorance of
ICWA, but may more likely be a result of difficulties arising in recruiting Indian foster homes,
especially in urban areas with small Indian populations. Id.
87. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (emphasis added).
88. Id.
89. Id. § 1903(1)(i) (emphasis added).
90. Id. § 1913(b) (emphasis added).
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seems to contradict the meaning of foster care placement.91 Reciting an
excerpt from the trial court’s decision, the appellate court in In re K.L.R.F.
stated in its opinion, “[§ 1913(b)] provides that consent can be withdrawn at
any time with regard to a foster care placement; and [§ 1903(1)(i)] just as
explicitly states that in a foster care placement, the parent or Indian custodian
cannot have the child returned upon demand.”92 Further, the trial court noted
that “if § 1903 is in fact what the legislature intended the definition of ‘foster
care placement’ to be, then § 1913(b) can be given no effect because a foster
care placement by definition precludes the possibility of a parent being entitled
to the return of the child upon demand.”93
The court in In re K.L.R.F. construed § 1913(b) to apply to situations
where a “consensual foster care placement [is] made in the first place and there
is no inherent bar to a withdrawal of the consent.”94 The court enumerated
three principles behind this decision. First, “the drafters of the statute did not
intend a result that is absurd or impossible of execution.”95 Second, “the
drafters did intend the entire statute to be effective and certain.”96 Finally,
“statutes enacted to benefit American Indians must be liberally construed with
all doubts resolved in favor of the Indian seeking its benefits or protections.”97
Thus, the provisions interact in such a way that they do not nullify each
other.98
The Federal Register, which provides guidelines to help clarify ICWA,
states that “[v]oluntary placements which do not operate to prohibit the child’s
parent . . . from regaining custody of the child at any time are not covered by
the Act.”99 The Alaska Supreme Court has explained that the
[c]ommentary to guideline B.3, which explains the reasons for creating this
exception, specifically refers to [formal written agreements between private
groups or states and parents for temporary custody] and stresses how such
agreements are to be structured so that ICWA will not apply to them . . . . The
guidelines recommend that the parties to such agreements explicitly provide
for return of the child upon demand if they do not wish the Act to apply to such
placements. Inclusion of such a provision is advisable because courts
frequently assume that when an agreement is reduced to writing, the parties
have only those rights specifically written into the agreement.100

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See supra text accompanying note 89.
515 A.2d 33, 36-37 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re K.L.R.F., 515 A.2d at 37.
Id.
44 Fed. Reg. 67,587 (Nov. 26, 1979).
D.E.D. v. Alaska, 704 P.2d 774, 781-82 (Alaska 1985).
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The Alaska Supreme Court, in D.E.D v. Alaska, determined that a voluntary
care agreement entered into by the biological mother with a family and youth
services organization, which allowed the state to provide temporary foster care
for the minor child, did not fall into ICWA’s definition of foster care
placement since the child could be returned to the mother “at any time.”101
This explanation by the Alaska Supreme Court, accompanied with the
guidelines set forth by the Federal Register, reveals that, if a court is faced with
the situation of a guardianship where the child can be returned upon demand, it
is not a child custody proceeding, and ICWA does not apply. However, § 1913
only becomes relevant after determining that the requirements of § 1903 have
not been satisfied. As the D.E.D. court explained, if the agreement fulfills the
suggestions by the guidelines for voluntary placement, that is, the parent
understands the terms, her intention is to use it for a short time (a few days
perhaps) and it is signed, ICWA is inapplicable. Thus, it does not have to
satisfy the requirements of § 1913.102
C. Case Illustrations of ICWA Guardianship Identification
Since the legislation’s inception in 1978, few courts have invoked ICWA
on account of the involvement of a guardianship proceeding of an Indian child.
Since the purpose of this legislative Note is to increase judicial awareness, it is
instructive to consider some of these ICWA guardianship cases. Elaborating
on some of these cases may be useful in improving identification of ICWA
guardianships.
1.

Grandparents as “Guardians”

In re A.K.H. involved a grandmother who successfully sought sole physical
and legal custody of the Indian child with visitation rights to the parents whose
parental rights were not terminated.103 While the parents were granted limited
rights, the nature of the guardianship did not allow for the return of the child
upon demand.104 The appellate court faced the issue of whether the Indian
tribe had a statutory right to intervene in the district court proceeding under
ICWA.105 The court had to first determine whether the proceeding involved a
foster care placement.106 The court considered the four prongs of ICWA foster
care placement: “(1) removing the Indian child from the child’s parent or
Indian custodian; (2) temporarily placing the child in a ‘foster home or
institution or the home of a guardian or conservator’ where; (3) the parent or

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 777, 781.
Id. at 782.
In re A.K.H., 502 N.W.2d 790, 792 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
Id.
Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c)).
Id. at 792.
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Indian custodian cannot have the child returned upon demand; and (4) parental
rights have not been terminated.”107 Concluding that prongs one, three and
four had been met, the focus of the court’s opinion was on prong two.108
In beginning its analysis, the Minnesota court referred to state statutes.
“Foster care” is defined under Minnesota statute as:
the 24 hour a day care of a child in any facility which for gain or otherwise
regularly provides one or more children, when unaccompanied by their
parents, with substitute for the care, food, lodging, training, education,
supervision or treatment they need but which for any reason cannot be
furnished by their parents or legal guardians in their homes.109

The court did not believe the grandmother’s home qualified as a foster
home based on this definition, so it focused its attention on the possibility of
guardianship status.110 Because the term “guardian” is not defined under the
Act, the court used the Minnesota statutory definition. A guardian of a minor
“has the powers and responsibilities of a parent . . . .”111 A guardian can
“facilitate the ward’s education, social and other activities and authorize
medical care.”112 The court determined that these powers would be granted to
the grandmother if she were awarded custody. Thus, the proceeding
encompassed the term guardian under ICWA, and ICWA applied.113
2.

Temporary Placement as “Foster Care Placement”

A Washington appellate court faced the same issue in defining guardian
with no guidance from the Act.114 There, the Indian tribe sought to vacate an
order awarding permanent custody of an Indian child to his natural mother’s
parents because the tribe had neither been notified of nor appeared at the
custody hearing.115 Neither party disputed that it was an involuntary
proceeding and the child was an Indian. The child, S.B.R., was removed from
the father for temporary placement, as opposed to a permanent adoptive
placement,116 and was put in the custody of the grandparents. Instead of
looking to state statutory law defining guardian, the court simply relied on
dictionary definitions.
It concluded that the rights acquired by the

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i)).
A.K.H., 502 N.W.2d at 792.
Id. at 792-93 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 260.015 (1994)).
Id. at 793.
Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 525.619 (1994)).
Id. at 793.
A.K.H., 502 N.W.2d at 793.
In re S.B.R., 719 P.2d 154, 156 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 155 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c)).
Id. at 156 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(iv)).
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grandparents qualified as ICWA guardianship rights under any definition.117
Since the father could not have the child returned upon demand, but could only
seek to modify the child custody decree,118 this was a foster care placement
proceeding contemplated by ICWA.119
3.

Maternal Relatives as “Indian Custodians”

On appeal in state court, the Navajo Nation Indian tribe, in In re Ashley
Elizabeth R.,120 contested the “good cause” finding by the district court.121
However, the interesting issue the lower court faced, as it pertains to ICWA
guardianships, was whether the two Indian children in the case were
transferred by a “parent or Indian custodian.”122 This is another technicality of
the foster care placement definition that cannot be overlooked. The two
children were not living with their parents at the time of the guardianship
proceeding.123 Instead, they were under the custody of their paternal greataunt.124 The tribe successfully argued that this aunt constituted an Indian
custodian.125 An Indian custodian is “any Indian person who has legal custody
of an Indian child under tribal law or custom or under State law or to whom
temporary physical care, custody, and control has been transferred by the
parent of such child.”126 Based on a tribal social worker’s testimony, the court
determined that Navajo tradition dictated that custody of orphaned children is
vested within the mother’s family.127 This usually meant the maternal
grandmother was awarded custody.128 If the grandmother was not alive, as in
this case, then a maternal aunt was sufficient to satisfy the Indian custodian
requirement.129 Thus, fulfilling all other requirements of the foster care
placement definition, ICWA was applicable in the guardianship proceeding.130
4.

The Proper Incorporation of State Law

The aforementioned cases all involve Indian children and guardianships.
However, it is also instructive to look at a procedurally complex case that does
117. Id.; see also WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 599 (3d ed. 1988); BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 712 (7th ed. 1999).
118. S.B.R., 719 P.2d at 156 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.260 (1985)).
119. Id.
120. 863 P.2d 451 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
121. See supra note 77.
122. Ashley Elizabeth R., 863 P.2d at 453 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i)).
123. Id. at 452.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 453.
126. Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1903(6)).
127. Ashley Elizabeth R., 863 P.2d at 453.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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not involve an Indian child. Stevens v. Redwing,131 a case decided by the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, presents the exact fact pattern that gives rise
to the guardianship dilemma, and thus is a useful tool for understanding the
overlooked issues with ICWA guardianships. The plaintiff, Stevens, was
serving a prison sentence with the Missouri Department of Corrections for
second degree murder.132 While on parole he married and his daughter, Jami
Lynn, was born in 1990.133 The plaintiff’s wife died shortly thereafter in a car
accident.134 Stevens returned to prison after a parole violation, and the child’s
maternal grandparents, the Sanders, began caring for Jami Lynn.135 In 1993,
Stevens consented to the appointment of the grandparents as guardians and
conservators for his daughter.136 The plaintiff filed a formal consent with the
probate division of the Circuit Court of Stone County, Missouri, which stated,
“I understand that I shall not have any right or claim to control or custody of
such child . . . .”137
In March of 1993, the child’s maternal aunt, defendant Redwing, came
from her home in Georgia to take Jami Lynn back to live with her and her
husband with the consent of the guardians and conservators.138 The Redwings
sought permanent custody of Jami Lynn through the Georgia state juvenile
court.139 Without approval of the Missouri probate court, the Sanders
consented to the change in custody in the Georgia proceeding.140 Ultimately,
the Georgia court awarded the Redwings permanent custody of Jami Lynn.141
The Sanders then petitioned the Missouri court to terminate their
guardianship due to their health problems.142 The court denied multiple
motions and written objections that Stevens filed in that court.143 Eventually,
the court terminated the grandparents’ guardianship of Jami Lynn and forfeited

131. 146 F.3d 538 (8th Cir. 1998). Because this was a diversity suit, the action was in federal
court, but Missouri law applied.
132. Id. at 541.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 541-42.
135. Id. at 542.
136. Stevens, 146 F.3d at 542. It is worth noting that Stevens is distinguished from the
scenario in D.E.D. because, although there was a consensual, or voluntary agreement in Stevens,
no provision indicated that the child could be returned upon demand. In fact, it was quite the
opposite, wherein the father consented to relinquish all rights to the child. Thus, it did “operate to
prohibit the child’s parent . . . from regaining custody of the child at any time.” See supra text
accompanying notes 99-102.
137. Stevens, 146 F.3d at 542.
138. Id. (grandparents consented because both were ill).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Stevens, 146 F.3d at 542.
143. Id.
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jurisdiction to the state of Georgia.144 Stevens filed a notice of appeal with the
probate court; however, the appeal was never processed.145
In January 1995, the Redwings filed a petition in Georgia to terminate
Stevens’ parental rights alleging sexual abuse of the minor child.146 While that
action was still pending, Stevens filed suit in federal court seeking money
damages for various torts.147 In his complaint he named the Redwings as
defendants and, among other claims, alleged conspiracy to interfere with his
custody rights. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss all
claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit
considered the causes of action raised by Stevens.
On the issue of whether the Redwings conspired to interfere with Stevens’s
custody of Jami Lynn, the court held that Stevens had no custody right in the
state of Missouri that would give defendants an opportunity to interfere.148 In
Missouri, interference with custody may only be asserted by one who has
custody rights.149 The court emphasized that Stevens had consented to
appointment of the grandparents and even acknowledged he no longer had
“any right or claim to control or custody of such child.”150 Furthermore, he
understood “that the appointment [was] permanent and [would] not be set aside
merely at [his] request.”151
The court then considered the Missouri statutory law dealing with the
rights of a guardian. A Missouri statute provides that “[t]he guardian of the
person of a minor shall be entitled to the custody and control of the
ward . . . .”152 In other words, the statute specifies the order of authority
between a guardian and the non-guardian parent. The guardian has the
ultimate right to make decisions for the child, while the parent has lost these
custodial and controlling rights. Although Stevens voluntarily surrendered
physical custody of Jami Lynn and parental rights had not been terminated, the
formal consent relinquishing all his legal custody rights, combined with the
rights of a guardian established by Missouri statutory law, did not allow for the
return of the child upon Stevens’s demand.153

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Stevens, 146 F.3d at 542. The tort claims included “conspiracy to interfere with his
custody rights, conspiracy to interfere with a contract, conspiracy to harbor a child, conspiracy to
alienate the affections of his daughter, defamation, malicious prosecution, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.” Id.
148. Id. at 544.
149. Id. (citing Politte v. Politte, 727 S.W.2d 198, 199-200 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. MO. REV. STAT. § 475.120 (2000).
153. Stevens, 146 F.3d at 544.
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V. ANALYSIS OF ICWA GUARDIANSHIPS
A.

Missing the Opportunity

To answer whether courts miss the opportunity to apply ICWA in
guardianship proceedings, the first question that must be asked is whether
courts even identify guardianships as potential triggers for ICWA application.
Evidence suggests that some do not. As witnessed in some proceedings
involving Indian children and guardianships, it is apparent that there is not a
clear understanding or awareness of the notion that some guardianships are
governed by ICWA. For example, the decision by the Montana Supreme
Court in In re Bertelson154 clearly shows that guardianship proceedings, which
call for Indian tribal jurisdiction, are not always identified.
Bertelson concerned a custody dispute between the natural mother and
grandparents of an Indian child. The Bertelson court categorized the conflict
as “an internal family dispute”155 and held that ICWA was not intended to
cover such proceedings.156 Rather, the Act was intended to “preserve Indian
culture values under circumstances in which an Indian child is placed in a
foster home or other protective institution.”157 The Bertelson decision suggests
that judges and attorneys believe ICWA only applies when a state, rather than
a private party, is seeking placement out of the home. This is a minority
position, but one that is followed by a number of state and federal courts.158
There is, however, no explicit language in the Act which makes such a
distinction between a public and private party seeking involuntary
placement.159
The confused issue of identifying ICWA guardianship proceedings signals
danger because, once the opportunity to apply the Act is overlooked, state law
154. 617 P.2d 121 (Mont. 1980).
155. Id. at 126.
156. See id. at 125.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous. Auth., 719 F.2d 979, 985 (9th Cir.
1983) (requiring, for the invocation of federal jurisdiction, that the dispute arise from substantial
activities outside the reservation); Comanche Indian Tribe v. Hovis, 847 F. Supp. 871, 876 n.4
(W.D. Okla. 1994) (recognizing the split among courts as to ICWA application to intra-family
disputes); In re Baisley, 749 P.2d 446, 449 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987); In re A.K.H., 502 N.W.2d 790,
794 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing, but declining to follow, the minority view); Desjarlait v.
Desjarlait, 379 N.W.2d 139, 142 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that states may have no authority
over internal affairs of the reservation unless state jurisdiction is voluntarily invoked by those
within); In re C.W., 479 N.W.2d 105, 112-13 (Neb. 1992); In re Skillen, 956 P.2d 1, 18-19
(Mont. 1998); State v. Horseman, 866 P.2d 1110, 1114-15 (Mont. 1993); In re Zier, 750 P.2d
1083, 1084 (Mont. 1988).
159. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (defining “child custody proceeding”); see also A.B.M. v.
M.H., 651 P.2d 1170, 1173 n.6 (Alaska 1982) (declining to follow Bertelson because the court’s
interpretation was contrary to express provisions of the Act).
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is applied, defeating the purpose of the federal legislation. There is practically
no way of assessing how frequently this issue has actually slipped through the
cracks. It is worth exploring the probable cause for missing these opportunities
as an instrument for decreasing the level of ignorance among courts
nationwide.160
The problem exists, in part, because of the commonly accepted definitions
pertaining to guardianships and child custody proceedings, coupled with the
assumption that ICWA is inapplicable. The Act does not define “guardian”161
or “guardianship.” The common legal definition of guardian is “[o]ne who has
the legal authority and duty to care for another’s person or property,
[especially] because of the other’s infancy, incapacity, or disability.”162 The
Supreme Court of Alaska adopted another common definition of the term.163
The court determined that, in an Indian child guardianship proceeding, a
guardian is (1) a person who guards, protects or takes care of another person or
(2) a person legally placed in charge of the affairs of a minor.164 A
guardianship is defined as “the position and responsibilities of a guardian,
[especially] toward a ward.”165 The common legal definition of “custody
hearing” is “a judicial examination of the facts relating to parental custody in a
divorce or separation proceeding.”166 “Custody” is defined as “[t]he care,
control, and maintenance of a child awarded by a court to a relative, [usually]
one of the parents, in a divorce or separation proceeding.”167
These definitions are far from suggesting that custody of a minor child and
the guardianship of a minor child are one and the same as ICWA indicates.
However, there are similarities. For instance, care for a person because of
infancy seems substantially related to parenting, an issue in custody hearings.
160. Proponents of Indian rights commonly invoke the state-tribal relationship argument for
explaining why Indians have been neglected in a specific area of the law. That is, both parties
have interests in controlling land and resources. But, because tribes have been at a political
disadvantage for years, state judicial/governmental structures have prevailed in most cases. See
generally U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, INDIAN TRIBES: A CONTINUING QUEST FOR
SURVIVAL 41-43 (June 1981). While this may be a plausible argument for the issue at hand, it
will not be the focus of the ensuing analysis.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 109-117.
162. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (7th ed. 1999). Guardian is also termed “custodian.”
See also 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i) (including “conservator” in its definition of foster care
placement). Because “guardianships” and “conservatorships” are nearly identical, this Note
focuses solely on guardianships. Implicitly, “conservators” have the same relative rights as do
guardians under ICWA.
163. See J.W. v. R.J., 951 P.2d 1206, 1213 n.12 (Alaska 1998).
164. See id. (citing WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 620 (1972)).
165. WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 593 (Robert B. Costello ed., 1995).
166. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (7th ed. 1999). There is no legal definition for child
custody proceeding, the term defined in 25 USC § 1903, thus “custody hearing” is defined in its
place for the sake of explaining the problem.
167. Id.
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However, the mention of either term does not automatically trigger its
association with the other. It is possible that judges and attorneys simply fail
to think of ICWA as a possibility when a guardianship is at stake because they
naturally are not considering it within the scope of a custody hearing, or a child
custody proceeding.
Similarly, there is a significant difference between adoptions of Indian
children, which fall under ICWA, and guardianships which do not fall under
the same provision. A California appellate court in Jacqueline L. v. Eric L.168
explained that “[a]doptions are permanent. For better or worse, the parties are
stuck with each other. Not so with guardianships, which can be ended with a
court hearing.”169
The same is true when considering “foster care placements,” a subset of
child custody proceedings under ICWA.170 One legal definition of foster care
placement is “[t]he [usually temporary] act of placing a child in a home with a
person or persons who provide parental care of the child.”171 State statutes that
define terms such as “foster care,” “foster care placement,” or “foster home”
are rare. Colorado defines foster care as “the placement of a child into the
legal custody or legal authority of a county department of social services for
physical placement of the child in a certified or licensed facility.”172 In Maine,
long-term foster care is “a foster placement for a child in the custody of the
department in which the department retains custody of the child while
delegating to the foster parents the duty and authority to make certain
decisions.”173 Arizona defines foster home as: “a home maintained by any
individual or individuals having the care or control of minor children, other
than those related to each other by blood or marriage, or related to such
individuals, or who are legal wards of such individuals.”174
These definitions have a common theme: there is no mention of the word
guardian or guardianship. Consequently, while guardianships and foster care
placements are generally temporary, the perception of foster care placement is
that it does not include guardianships found within the ICWA definition of
foster care placement. Thus, it is not reasonable to believe a court is
automatically put on notice that ICWA could apply when there is a
guardianship proceeding.
A closer analysis of statutory language among various states more clearly
reveals the idea that there is insufficient notice of potential ICWA applicability
in guardianship proceedings. Consider the definition of “custody proceeding”
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 178 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 181.
See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i).
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 666 (7th ed. 1999).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-103 (2000).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4064 (West 1999).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-501 (1999).
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in the state of Arizona, one of the most heavily Indian-populated states in the
union:175 “‘Custody proceeding’ means proceedings in which a custody
determination is one of several issues, such as an action for divorce or
dissolution of marriage or separation, and includes child neglect
proceedings.”176 There is no mention of guardianship within the definition.
Because the statute uses the words “such as,” the possibility is left open for
including guardianships within its definition. But, this possibility is left for the
court’s discretion. If the court does not consider a guardianship, then it falls
outside of the statutory definition. This augments the tendency of courts to not
consider whether ICWA is applicable. Courts are even more likely to overlook
the definition of “child custody proceeding” within ICWA.
Analysis of the Michigan statute is very similar. A custody proceeding
under Michigan statutory law, “includes proceedings in which a custody
determination is [one] of several issues including, but not limited to, an action
for divorce or separation and child neglect and dependency proceedings.”177 In
Foster v. Stein,178 the court expanded this analysis by holding that adoption
proceedings are included in the definition of a “custody proceeding.”179
Nevertheless, there is no reference to guardianship. The statutory language,
“but not limited to,” indicates that it is possible for a guardianship to fall within
the definition. This determination, however, is left to the court’s discretion. If
175. It is worthwhile to discuss Indian population among various states. In 1990, 1.878
million persons, representing 0.8% of the nation’s population, reported themselves as Native
Americans. Some jurisdictions seldom have reason to consider ICWA because there is a low
level of Indian residents. Thus, a lack of familiarity with the Act may be even greater in areas
such as Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Illinois, Ohio, Virginia, Massachusetts, Tennessee, South
Carolina, Connecticut, Kentucky, New Hampshire and Indiana where Native Americans compose
no more than 0.2% of the entire state’s population. Perhaps, judges from the above listed states
are even more prone to misconstruing or considering ICWA application. See generally
ALMANAC OF THE 50 STATES: BASIC DATA PROFILES WITH COMPARATIVE TABLES (Edith R.
Hornor ed., 2000).
States heavily populated with Native Americans, however, have even greater incentive to
enact court rules and statutes that provide for clear directives as they pertain to ICWA. Some of
the most heavily populated states include: Oklahoma—population 252,089 (representing 8.0% of
total population); California—population 236,078 (representing 0.8% of total population);
Arizona—population 203,009 (representing 5.5% of total population); New Mexico—population
134,097 (representing 8.9% of total population); Alaska—population 31,245 (representing 5.7%
of total population); South Dakota—population 50,501 (representing 7.3% of total population);
Montana—population 47,524 (representing 5.9% of total population); and North Dakota—
population 25,870 (representing 4.0% of total population). Other states which are mentioned in
this Note include: Michigan—population 55,131 (representing 0.6% of total population);
Minnesota—population 49,392 (representing 1.1% of total population); Missouri—population
19,508 (representing 0.4% of total population). See generally id.
176. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-432(3) (2000).
177. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.652(c) (2000).
178. 454 N.W.2d 244 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
179. Id. at 246.
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courts have traditionally excluded “guardianships” from the definition, then
they are likely to also assume exclusion from coverage under ICWA.
This explanation cannot be completely persuasive because there are state
statutes that specifically provide for inclusion of guardianship actions within
custody proceedings. For example, the framework of the Missouri statute is as
follows: “‘Custody proceeding’ includes proceedings in which a custody
determination is one of several issues, such as an action for dissolution of
marriage, legal separation, separate maintenance, appointment of a guardian of
the person, child neglect or abandonment . . . .”180 In these jurisdictions, where
the state statute actually indicates that guardianships are custody proceedings,
it seems that judges and lawyers are more likely to be put on notice that ICWA
may apply.181 The court would then have reason to know it needs to inquire
into whether the child is of Native American ancestry.182
B.

The Courts’ Role: A Step Further

Perhaps the problem has come about because some state legislatures have
not enacted provisions that clearly direct courts to ICWA in applicable
situations. However, courts must bear at least as much of the responsibility as
legislators. The issue of whether ICWA applies to minor guardianship
proceedings could become conspicuous with the enactment of court rules that
address ICWA’s applicability. The court rules of Michigan are illustrative of
the inadequate direction taken by some state court rules as they pertain to child
custody hearings.
In Michigan, court rules, rather than legislation, address ICWA issues.183
At the outset of a child protective proceeding, a preliminary hearing must be
conducted where a number of items are addressed.184 One procedural
provision mandates that the court “inquire if the child or parent is a registered
member of any American Indian tribe or band, or if the child is eligible for

180. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.445 (2000) (emphasis added).
181. The Oklahoma statute is another example of a “notice” statute. The language provides
that “‘[c]hild custody proceeding’ means a proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody,
or visitation with respect to a child is an issue. The term includes a proceeding for divorce,
separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights,
and protection from domestic violence . . . .” OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 551-102 (West 1999)
(emphasis added). Note that Oklahoma, like Arizona, is one of the more heavily Indianpopulated states making the inconsistency among the states even more perplexing.
182. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text (explaining the proper application of
ICWA).
183. See MICH. CT. R. 5.965, 5.980.
184. See MICH. CT. R. 5.965(B)-(C) (including procedures for reading the petition in open
court, determining if the petition should be dismissed, advising the parties of their rights,
allowing respondent the opportunity to admit or deny allegations, authorizing the filing of the
petition and determining pre-trial placement of the minor child).
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such membership.”185 If this is the case, the court must then “determine and
notify the tribe or band and follow the procedures [for child custody
proceedings concerning American Indian children].”186 This language directs
the court to provisions set forth under another court rule, which states that “[i]f
any Indian child as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act [25 U.S.C. §§
1901-63] is the subject of a protective proceeding or is charged with an offense
in violation of [certain juvenile delinquency statutes],”187 then the procedures
enumerated within the rule must be applied.188
The provisions make reference to ICWA, and they make reference to child
custody proceedings concerning Indian children. Surprisingly, however, the
rules are not structured to guide, much less instruct, a judge to consider ICWA
if a guardianship proceeding is at bar or if there is a custody dispute between
natural Indian parents and third parties. The construction of the rule becomes
even more peculiar when considering what is included within it. Michigan
Court Rule 5.980 mingles ICWA with child protective proceedings and
delinquency proceedings. A child protective proceeding concerns “an offense
against a child,”189 but it is not explicitly a category of child custody
proceeding under ICWA.190
Furthermore, ICWA does not apply to
delinquency placements. A delinquency proceeding, in Michigan, concerns
“an offense against a juvenile.”191 An “act which, if committed by an adult,
would be deemed a crime” is not subject to ICWA.192 Nevertheless, the courts
of Michigan borrow the federal definition of “Indian child”193 and combine it
with the state’s court rule language pertaining to protective proceedings and
delinquency proceedings.194 This combination of law is used to ascertain
whether the procedures within the court rule handling child custody
proceedings concerning American Indian children apply.195
Studying this explicit language in the court rule, the concern then becomes
apparent. A judge may easily overlook the possibility of ICWA application to
guardianships and other custody battles involving third parties and the natural
parents inasmuch as those court rules are otherwise silent.

185. MICH. CT. R. 5.965(B)(7).
186. Id.
187. MICH. CT. R. 5.980(A) (emphasis added).
188. See id.
189. MICH. CT. R. 5.903(A)(2).
190. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1).
191. MICH. CT. R. 5.903(A)(3).
192. Id. See also supra note 54 and accompanying text.
193. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (“‘Indian child’ means any unmarried person who is under age
eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an
Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe . . . .”).
194. See MICH. CT. R. 5.980(A).
195. See id.
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C. The Hierarchy of Power: Guardianship Rights vis-à-vis Parental Rights
Even if an Indian child is involved in a guardianship-related child custody
proceeding, ICWA does not apply in all guardianships. The guardianship at
issue must be one that does not allow for the return of the child upon demand
of the non-guardian parent.196 In this situation, a significant amount of power
is granted to the guardian as compared to the natural parent. This lopsided
balance of power must exist for ICWA to apply.197 If a state statute allows the
parent to demand the child back under any circumstances, then the
guardianship does not lie within the definition of foster care placement and,
thus, is not a child custody proceeding signaling ICWA application.
The key inquiry involves the comparison between the rights of the
guardian and the rights of the custodial parent. When the parent has
relinquished custody but the parental rights have not been terminated by the
court, as was the case in A.K.H.,198 S.B.R.199 and Ashley Elizabeth R.,200 state
statutory law heavily favors the guardian.201 Accordingly, this most likely
196. 25 U.S.C. 1903(1)(i). See also supra notes 10, 89 and accompanying text.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 101-130 for illustrations of this balance of power.
See also text accompanying notes 131-153 for a discussion of Stevens v. Redwing, 146 F.3d 538
(8th Cir. 1998), the non-ICWA case which presents similar guardianship issues as those being
discussed in this section. This is the type of guardianship ICWA is intended to govern if the child
involved is an Indian child.
In Stevens, the guardianship of the grandparents did not allow for Stevens to demand the
child back if he desired. At best, explained the court, the father could have undertaken a separate
action in Missouri probate court to terminate the guardianship and to restore his right to custody.
See id. at 544. Ultimately, though, no immediate return of the child to the father was possible.
Stevens did make various motions and appealed the order of termination of guardianship in the
Missouri probate court, following the instructions set out in the statute. See id. at 542. Thus, the
actions of the Missouri probate court were the real focus of the examination. The federal court
was not responsible for the decision made in the Missouri court. See id. at 544. Furthermore, the
actual interests of the child were not in question in the federal court action; the issue was whether
the defendant was liable to the father in tort.
The proceedings in the probate court illustrate a situation where a missed opportunity to
apply ICWA can occur. Assuming Jami Lynn was not an Indian child, no application of ICWA
was relevant. However, if the child were Indian, the court would have to be aware that the
guardianship was one that met the definition of “child custody proceeding” under ICWA. At that
point, all the procedural and substantive aspects of the law would come into play. Most
importantly, the tribal court would have to be put on notice, so it would have the opportunity to
become involved in the action.
198. In re A.K.H., 502 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
199. In re S.B.R., 719 P.2d 154 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
200. In re Ashley Elizabeth R., 863 P.2d 451 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
201. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.084(e) (Michie 2000) (“When there has been transfer
of legal custody or appointment of a guardian and parental rights have not been terminated by
court decree, the parents shall have residual rights and responsibilities,” not including the right to
have the child returned upon demand.); CAL. PROB. CODE § 2351 (Deering 2000) (stating that,
subject to limitations on care, custody and control determined by the court, “the guardian or
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means that the parent could not demand the return of the child. Thus, in most
states, the court must conclude that ICWA applies if in fact the child is deemed
to be an Indian. If parental rights have not been terminated, statutes are not
always clear as to whether the child can be returned upon demand. Most of
these statutes allow judicial discretion to determine the rights and
responsibilities of the parties.202 If this is the case, then the statute does not
specify whether the non-custodial parent(s) still can demand the release of the
child from the guardian. This is an unsettling issue which courts have not
addressed. Nevertheless, what is clear is that, if (1) the parent cannot demand
the child back and (2) the child is an Indian, ICWA applies. If the parent can
demand the child back, regardless of whether the child is an Indian, ICWA
does not apply.
D. Applying ICWA When State Law Ambiguously Defines a Guardianship
Assuming that the court is able to correctly recognize that ICWA may
apply to a guardianship proceeding and it correctly construes the federal
provisions, specifically 25 U.S.C. §§ 1903 and 1913, a state statute or court
rule may be ambiguous as to whether a child can be returned upon demand.203
As discussed in In re J.B., “the nature of the proceeding is determined by what
is pending or potentially pending before the state court.”204 This means that
the state court has both the authority and the obligation to determine the type
of proceeding before it. Relying on its own law, the court often lacks the
applicable rules to characterize a proceeding. There is no case law determining
whether ICWA applies in these ambiguous situations. Without an agreement
between the parties specifying whether the child can be returned upon

conservator, has the care, custody, and control of . . . the ward or conservatee.”). See also COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-14-312 (2000); IDAHO CODE § 15-5-209 (Michie 2000); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT.
405/1-3 (2000); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.15215 (Michie 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-31
(Michie 2000).
202. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-871(D) (2000) (“Unless otherwise set forth in the final
order of permanent guardianship, a permanent guardian is vested with all rights and
responsibilities set forth in [other sections of the statutes] . . . .”). This statute gives the court
primary authority to decide rights of the parties. If the court does not specify, then statutory law
controls. For an example of a state which handles this matter slightly differently by allowing a
recommendation from a state agency to be submitted to the court, see ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27338 (Michie 1999).
203. Michigan is one state where the statute and court rules lend no direction in this regard to
child custody proceedings. Interestingly, however, the child protective proceedings are more
detailed in regard to problems of similar nature.
204. In re J.B., 900 P.2d 1014, 1017 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995) (referring to §§ 1903 and 1911(b)
of the Act).
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demand,205 a court is entirely left to itself to determine whether ICWA applies.
Considering the statutory construction of ICWA, courts should rule that, if a
statute or court rule lacks clarity, and it cannot be determined that a parent
cannot take the child back upon demand, there is a presumption that the child
cannot be returned, and, consequently, ICWA applies. Subsequently, the
proceeding should be halted until the tribe is put on notice.206
Arriving at this conclusion, the underlying principle is that
Congress through the Indian Child Welfare Act has expressed its clear
preference for keeping Indian children with families, deferring to tribal
judgment on matters concerning the custody of tribal children, and placing
Indian children who must be removed from their homes within their own
families or Indian tribes. Proceedings in state courts involving the custody of
Indian children shall follow strict procedures and meet stringent requirements
to justify any result in an individual case contrary to these preferences. The
Indian Child Welfare Act, the federal regulations implementing the Act, the
recommended guidelines and any state statutes, regulations or rules
promulgated to implement the Act shall be liberally construed in favor of a
result that is consistent with these preferences.207

While, admittedly, the state rules defining proceedings such as guardianships
and other foster care placements were not enacted for the specific purpose of
catering to the needs of American Indians, it can easily be accepted that
Congress, through ICWA, delegated some decision-making power to the
states, so long as the principles of ICWA are instilled in their decisions. Thus,
in deciding if the federal act applies, state court rules or, in this case, statutes
are to be construed to favor ICWA application, because ICWA was enacted for
the sole purpose of benefiting American Indian tribes, families, and children.
A second reason for applying ICWA when state law is unclear whether the
guardianship allows for return of the child on demand is because it follows the
historical approach in the interpretation of other provisions of the Act.
Consider these three instances: first, if a parent asserts the possibility of Indian
membership, the predominate approach is to assume this to be true until the
tribe or other proper authority establishes that no Indian membership exists

205. See supra text accompanying notes 135 and 148-49 (discussing existence of written
agreement between parties in Stevens). See also supra text accompanying note 99 (discussing
existence of agreement between parties in D.E.D.).
206. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a). See also supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text; see supra
text accompanying note 117.
207. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,854,
67,585-86 (Nov. 26, 1979). See also In re K.L.R.F., 515 A.2d 33, 37 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
(“statutes enacted to benefit American Indians must be liberally construed with all doubts
resolved in favor of the Indian seeking its benefits or protections”).
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among the parties.208 Second, ICWA requires transfer to tribal courts absent
good cause.209 While the Act does not define “good cause,” practically all
courts have adopted the Bureau of Indian Affairs definition, which restricts
state courts.210 Third, if the Indian child is not domiciled within an Indian
reservation or is not a ward of the tribal court, there is still a presumption of
tribal jurisdiction.211 These historical approaches to applying the Act suggest a
consistent interpretation that favors tribal involvement.
The liberal construction requirement and the historical interpretation of the
Act suggest one common theme: ICWA is typically presumed to apply and the
tribal court must be put on notice. This theme should permeate throughout all
provisions, including § 1903(1)(i). This becomes even more apparent when
considering that to rule otherwise would run afoul of the purposes of the Act:
to preserve Indian heritage and properly determine the child’s best interest.
E.

The Effects of Missed Opportunities to Apply ICWA

The stated purpose of ICWA is “to protect the best interests of Indian
children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families
by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for removal of Indian
children [from their homes].”212 In regard to the Indian child, what is clearly
lost is any consideration of the unique best interests standard established by
ICWA.213 By including some guardianships under the definition of “child
custody proceeding,” Congress has communicated its belief that children in
these proceedings are no different from children involved in adoption
placement or custody proceedings. It seems illogical to think that an Indian
child involved, for instance, in an adoption proceeding is entitled to more
protection from the tribe. Or, put another way, there is no justification for
providing an Indian child in a guardianship proceeding less protection than a
child in an adoption proceeding.
Nonetheless, state statutes and court rules leave room for this to occur.
Thus, the potential for cultural bias greatly increases in guardianship matters
involving Indian children. This clearly frustrates Congress’s belief that Indian
children present a special situation where the tribal heritage has much positive
impact on the child. Furthermore, if the tribe is not put on notice, then it is
208. See Helen Ann Yunis & Katherine Scotta, The Indian Child Welfare Act: A Case Study,
2 MICH. CHILD WELFARE J. 14, 15 (1998).
209. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b).
210. See supra text accompanying note 77; Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody
Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67,854.
211. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989); see also 25
U.S.C. § 1911(b).
212. 25 U.S.C. § 1902; see also supra text accompanying note 81.
213. See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text (discussing the Indian child’s best
interest).
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impossible for the tribe to offer any assistance to the child. Tribes often
provide counseling services and other resources to Indian children and families
during the course of these types of proceedings.214 These sources could
potentially alleviate some of the psychological strain on the child, provide
assistance to parents with substance abuse problems or abusive behavior and
even help avoid separation of the family.
Not only do these missed opportunities to apply ICWA affect Indian
children, such circumstances hinder Indian tribes in seeing that ICWA’s
purposes are met. First and quite obviously, without knowledge that the
proceeding is taking place, tribes cannot intervene to bid for keeping the child
within the tribe. This again frustrates the statute’s purpose to provide a means
for preserving the Indian heritage. In this regard, the tribes have a significant
interest in the member children.215
Second, tribes face problems intervening if it is discovered that they should
have been put on notice at the commencement of the proceeding because it was
determined that an Indian child was involved.216 Because Congress intended
to increase tribal participation, the litigation will be prolonged, complicated
and more costly.217 This has been a historical problem with the Act.218 For
instance, in In re Elliott,219 in the middle of a proceeding to terminate parental
rights, the trial court became aware that the child involved belonged to an
Indian tribe.220 The court had already heard testimony from expert witnesses
from Catholic Family Services.221 Nevertheless, it adjourned the proceedings

214. See Douglas R. Nazarian, Catholic Social Services Inc. v. C.A.A.: Best Interests and
Statutory Construction of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 7 ALASKA L. REV. 203, 219 n.93 (1990).
This contravenes the clear language of [§] 1912(d): Any party seeking to effect a . . .
termination of parental rights to an Indian child under State law shall satisfy the court that
active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs
designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved
unsuccessful.
Id.
215. See id. at 214.
216. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (giving the Indian child’s tribe the right to intervene at any point
in the proceeding).
217. See Nazarian, supra note 214, at 214.
218. While excessive litigation has been a historical problem with the Act, some states, like
Michigan, have enacted court rules to alleviate the problem. Under MICH. COURT RULE
5.965(B)(7), a judge is required to ask if the child or either parent is a member of an American
Indian tribe or band. Additionally, the petitioner must use a form with a pre-printed paragraph,
which requires the petitioner to list tribal affiliation. This reduces the likelihood of discovering
heritage later in the proceedings.
219. 554 N.W.2d 32 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
220. See id. at 33. The court did not recognize the child as an Indian child when the
proceeding began because it did not follow the explicit directive in MICH. COURT RULE
5.965(B)(7) to inquire about the mother’s or the minor child’s tribal status. See id. at 38.
221. Id. at 33-34.
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for further investigation of the issue and to notify the Chippewa Tribe.222 The
tribe petitioned the court to intervene, which the court allowed.223 Ultimately,
in terminating the child’s parental rights, the court determined that although
the child was an Indian and the Act was applicable, complying with certain
provisions that would necessitate more litigation was not necessary.224 The
court’s rationale was that the child had not been brought up as an Indian child
in an Indian family,225 and thus it did not “justif[y] a basis for delaying a
decision in this case.”226 Since the mother was not intimately involved with
her tribe, the benefits of allowing expert testimony at that juncture were not
enough to outweigh the benefits of continuing the proceeding without such
testimony.
The matter came before the state appellate court, which determined that the
lower court had committed clear legal error in interpreting ICWA.227 The
court squarely rejected the “existing Indian family” exception in accordance
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield.228 The court was concerned with the direct conflict the exception
had with Congress’s purpose of ensuring Indian cultural preservation.229
ICWA clearly mandates that any foster care placement or termination of
parental rights action be invalidated upon a showing by any parent, Indian
custodian or the child’s Indian tribe that the action violated any provision of §§
1911-13, which pertain to tribal jurisdiction, parental rights, voluntary
termination and, the matter in this case, pending court proceedings.230
Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the action for a new hearing to
allow for thorough compliance with the Act.
222. Id. at 34.
223. See id.
224. Most notably, the respondent argued, inter alia, that since no qualified expert testimony
had taken place, a new trial was necessary. See Elliott, 554 N.W.2d at 34. § 1912(e) provides
that
[n]o foster care placement may be ordered in such proceeding in the absence of a
determination, supported by clear and convincing evidence, including testimony of
qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian
custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.
25 U.S.C. § 1912(e) (emphasis added). The trial court, because of the phase of the proceeding,
rejected this argument. See Elliott, 554 N.W. 2d at 34.
225. See Elliot, 554 N.W.2d at 33-34. At the time of trial, the child was three and one-half
years old. The father was not affiliated with any tribe or band, but the mother was a member of
the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians. While the facts were unclear, it appears that the
child resided in Kalamazoo County, Michigan, outside the parameters of the mother’s tribe. See
id.
226. Id. at 34.
227. See id. at 35.
228. 490 U.S. 30 (1989). See also supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
229. See Elliott, 554 N.W.2d at 36-37.
230. See 25 U.S.C. § 1914.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2002]

THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978

245

The Chippewa Tribe, not to mention all parties in the action, became
involved in needless litigation—litigation that could have been avoided had it
been discovered at the beginning of the proceeding that ICWA applied. This
problem has existed since the Act’s inception in 1978 and poses a threat to
actions involving guardianship and custody disputes between third parties and
the biological Indian parents.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL ALERTNESS TO POTENTIAL ICWA
SITUATIONS
The inappropriate attention courts give ICWA guardianships does not
imply that state courts have entirely failed to adhere to ICWA, causing a
collapse of the fundamental objectives of the Act. Indeed, it is impossible to
monitor the frequency of cases being overlooked involving an Indian child in a
guardianship matter. However, this problem to which many courts may be
oblivious invites, at the very least, difficulties in isolated circumstances.
Familiarization with the Act is the first step toward prevention. Indian
populations are continuing to grow. Therefore, there is reason to believe
courts will be called upon to apply the Act with greater frequency.
Unfortunately, the inadequate attention to which guardianship matters are
prone in regard to ICWA demonstrates the overall lack of understanding of the
Act.
Congress has clearly called for tribal involvement, specifically the
possibility of tribal court jurisdiction and the tribal notice requirement, through
the enactment of ICWA. Applying the Act in guardianship proceedings
provides a means for this involvement. This involvement can be more easily
procured through enactment of state court rules and statutes which direct a
person to ICWA and amendments to guardianship or which clearly specify
whether a non-custodial parent can receive the child upon demand. Such
enactments augment congressional intent, as well as the underlying purpose of
the Act itself.
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